HA(L)-3 Seawolf Association Archive

US Navy Helicopter Attack (Light) Squadron Three Seawolves, Vietnam 1966-1972

 

The Seawolf Association is looking for any personnel who were attached to HA(L)-3, HC-1, or FASU Binh Thuy. If you were, or know anyone who was, please contact us at (757) 288-9704. We do not have access to the official Navy records as they remain classified in the National Archives due to the covert nature of many of the operations, therefore, the only way we can locate fellow Seawolves is with your help.
On 3 January 1997, the Bureau of Naval Personnel authorized, retroactively, the awarding of the Combat Aircrew Insignia to Combat Aircrewmen who served in HA(L)-3. With this approval, we need to locate our doorgunners so they can be awarded these devices and accompanying certificate. To request the insignia, fill out and send in the attached affidavit.

Last Update 8 Jan 2018

Navy Seawolves

 

Early History

 


It is often said that necessity is the mother of invention. Nowhere in the annals of American aviation has this been more true than during the United States’ direct participation in the defense of the Republic of Vietnam. Pitted against an adversary who went to great lengths to conceal his movements and identity and who, at the same time, roamed a land of very diverse topography, the American forces in South Vietnam found themselves utilizing tactics and equipment unknown in previous conflicts. Air power has played a vital role in America’s strategic and tactical military doctrine since the Second World War, but in Vietnam it was to be of special significance. Here the airplane and helicopter were the GI’s lifeline, providing him with fire support, food, mail, ammunition, medical assistance and virtually instant transportation across the varied and inhospitable terrain of Indo-China.The southern quarter of what was once the Republic of Vietnam is known as the Mekong Delta. It is here that the meandering tributaries of the Mekong River empty into the South China Sea after the long journey from the Tibetan highlands. The region is characterized by broad, exceptionally fertile grasslands, marshes, mangrove swamps and rain forests punctuated by occasional mountian peaks along the Cambodian border and southwestern coast. The Mekong drains all of Indo-China and upon entering Vietnam it’s waters spread, fanlike, into the Mekong River Delta. During the summer monsoons, the region is completely inundated by water. What few roads that exist in the area connect only the major towns and most of the native populace must rely on the more than 2,500 miles of canals, rivers and streams for their transportation. During it’s existance as a sovereign country, nearly half of South Vietnam’s total population resided within the Mekong Delta turning out the country’s main cash crop, rice. It was estimated by some sources that this productive region has the potential to supply the rice needs for all of Southeast Asia.The military, political and economic importance of the region was long recognized by both sides in the Vietnam conflict. Joint allied naval operations had begun in the Mekong Delta in March 1965 when American destroyers, augmented by SP-5 and later SP-2H and P-3A aircraft, took up patrol stations around Vietnam’s southern coast to detect and track Viet Cong resupply vessels. In the fall of that same year the Navy initiated limited river patrols in the Delta on an experimental basis using armed LCPL-4 landing craft. Despite the fact that these vessels were slow and rather cumbersome in the tight confines of the Delta’s waterways, the concept proved itself valuable in disrupting the Viet Cong’s lines of communications, locating supply caches and eliminating tax collecting stations. Consequently, a commitment was made to continue river operations on a full scale basis across the breadth of the Mekong Delta.

To impliment this broad scheme, the LCPL-4s were abandoned in favor of an off the shelf pleasure boat converted for the purpose. Christened PBR, for Patrol Boat River, these 32 foot long craft were faster and more maneuverable than the LCPL-4s they replaced. Tradeoffs made for the sake of speed and agility also meant the PBRs were lighty armored and heavily armed. Carrying as their heaviest punch three .50 caliber machine guns and later a single 40mm grenade launcher, the waterways of the delta would be treacherous and life difficult for the PBR crews, particularly when pitted against the VC arsenal of recoilless rifles, rocket propelled grenades and command detonated mines.

Early on it had been recognized air support would be vital to the success and survival of the partol boats. At first army aviation units were tasked with the mission. On 11 March 1966 an element of the Army’s 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, with some 20 support personnel, began training exercises from the USS Belle Grove (LSD-2)LSD-2 preparatory to their participation in operation Jackstay, which commenced on 26 March. During this large scale operation, which was the first allied attempt to penetrate the Viet Cong stronghold southeast of Saigon known as the Rung Sat Special Zone, two US Army helicopters operated from the Belle Grove providing close air support to the Navy patrol boats and landing craft navigating the zone’s swampy terrain.

When the first 10 PBRs arrived in Vietnam on 21 March, the Belle Grove assumed the duty of mother ship for the new arrivals. After Operation Jackstay terminated on 4 April, the Army gunships remained aboard the Belle Grove to continue development of PBR gunship tactics preparatory to the PBRs first operational mission the next week. Assigned to the Navy’s newly activated Task Force 116, or operation Gamewarden, the first patrol was mounted on 10 April 1966 as 2 PBRs of River Squadron Five began operations along the Long Tau River. The Belle Grove was relieved of it’s duties to TF-116 on 19 April by the USS Tortuga (LSD-26).

This arrangement of Army air crews flying in support of naval operations from Navy ships caused difficulties which both services were quick to discover. Even though the Army pioneered the armed helicopter concept and developed much of it’s tactics, they did not have experience in supporting naval riverine operations. While that experience could undoubtedly have been gained over a period of time, it was felt naval aviators trained in gunship operations would more quickly and readily adapt to the mission requirements.

Part of this was the necessity to operate at night in bad weather from the deck of a ship. The PBRs worked around the clock in all weather conditions so it was highly desirable their air support would be available then as well. At this point in time, Army gunships were not equipped for and their pilots not skilled in all weather helicopter flying, particularly from a floating deck. In many cases, the Army would not accept missions in marginal weather, especially at night. Flying in the dark of night in bad weather or without good horizontal definition is a sticky proposition and more than one Army helicopter was lost under these conditions. It was believed that Navy helicopter pilots, skilled at antisubmarine warfare and search and rescue operations which required a similar all weather capability, would be better able to cope with this environment than their Army counterparts.

Also, a dedicated Navy air unit committed directly to the Gamewarden mission could provide a relatively stable source of air support that would not require careful inter-service coordination to assure availability. Direct Naval air support for the PBRs was viewed as the solution for existing and anticipated problems of command, control and availability.

The previous experience with Army helicopter gunships had shown this type of aircraft could provide a flexible response and was adaptable to the delta environment. Armed helicopters operating from remote and relatively unprepared locations offered at least twice the reaction time of fixed wing fighter bombers. Logistically, US Army and South Vietnamese fueling and arming points, already established across the region, would provide ready support and the very nature of the aircraft itself would alleviate the construction of large, hard surface airfields, always a problem in the water soaked delta. Captain John T. Shepherd, who in 1966 was th assistant chief of staff at the US Navy headquarters in Saigon, is generally credited with formulating the concept of using Navy armed helicopters in support of TF-116.

The Bell UH-1B helicopter had been in Vietnam since 1962, performing it’s duties as a troop transport and gunship. In the latter role, the helicopter had formed the backbone of the Army’s helicopter fleet for three years and had proven itself over all of Vietnam’s varied terrain. It was the locical choice for this mission. But in 1966 there was a shortage of UH-1 types available for use by the Navy. Long range Army requirements for the UH-1 series kept the Bell Helicopter assembly line busy and even though the UH-1E was in production for the Marines, it was committed to modernization of Marine helicopter squadrons by replacing the UH-34. Fortunately for the Navy, the Army had recently implemented plans to supplant the UH1B gunship with the reengined and restructured UH-1C. These surplus B Models would make a ready source of aircraft for the Navy’s use.

So it was that eight UH-1B helicopters were borrowed from the Army’s 197th Armed Helicopter Company in the summer of 1966 to form the nucleus of a Navy armed helicopter unit. Pilots and crewmen for the new venture were initially drawn from Helicopter Combat Support Squadron One based at NAS Ream Field, Imperial Beach, California. The first eight pilots and enlisted crewmen of HC-1, Detachment (Det) 29, were deployed to Vietnam on 1 July 1966. This was followed on the 17th and 29th of July by Dets 27 and 25, respectively. Det 21, last of the origional HC-1 detachments, was not deployed to Vietnam until several months later, arriving during the last week of November.

Because HC-1’s modus operandi was primarily search and rescue, logistical transport and supply, and vertical replentishment, the first crews were faced with a short training period provided by the Army. Under the terms of the initial agreement between the two services, Navy crews were to man the aircraft and provide maintenance at the unit level, but the Army was responsible for providing training, aircraft, spare parts, and higher echelon repair. On 30 August 1966, after completion of their familiarization training, Det 29 relieved the US Army helicopter fire team operating from thr Tortuga, anchored off the mouth of the Long Tau River, and, in doing so, opened a new chapter in Naval Aviation.

 

 

The Seawolves

Under the operational control of Commander Task Force (CTF) 116, the gunships initially would support the PBR operations with fire support, recon, and medevac services. But in fact the unit soon found itself called upon to assist the PCFs of TF-115 as well as the Vietnamese Navy units operating in the delta.

This early period was characterized by unit familiarization with their new aircraft, tactics and areas of operation. It was also a time of literal hand to mouth existance for these Navy flyers. Dependent on the Army supply system for their aviation assets and associated equipment, they often found their needs could be met only by imaginative begging or “borrowing” from other military units, most often Army. Attached to their parent squadron only for administrative purposes, the HC-1 Gamewarden dets enjoyed great autonomy in their operations and this was partially responsible for instilling in the crews a strong spirit of mission accomplishment which dictated an attitude of get the job done no matter what the cost or method required. A lot of official heads looked the other way during these early months. A special rapport that would last throughout the Vietnam Conflict was quickly established with the PBR sailors, who knew they could rely on the Navy gunships when a firefight started.

As has been seen, some initial operations were staged from LSD’s, which also did double duty as PBR bases. But late inn 1966, the USS Jennings County (LSD-846), modified with helicopter landing platforms and equipped to support gunship operations, arrived in country. This was the first of several converted LST’s which would replace the smaller LSD as support ships for Navy air and surface operations in the Delta.

The first major action for the Seawolves, as the unit had nicknamed itself, occurred during the waning daylight hours of 31 October 1966. Earlier, on routine patrol in the vicinity of My Tho City, two Navy PBRs had encountered a superior fleet of sampans and junks numbering well over 80 vessels, intent on transferring a battalion sized Viet Cong unit from one riverbank to the other. Attempting to follow a small sampan up the Nam Thon River, the two patrol boats came under intense fire from both sides of the riverbank and a group of 10 boats hiding in a small inlet. Retreating back down the river with dusk closing in, a call for air support went out. HC-1 Det 25 was scrambled and arrived over the scene some 15 minutes later. When asked by the flight leader where he wanted the air strike, the PBR commander replied simply, “I want y’all to go in there and hold field day on them guys.”

With the PBRs acting as decoys to pinpoint the enemy positions, Det 25 did just that. On their first pass, one junk disappeared in a secondary explosion as the munitions it carried detonated. On the second run they were greeted by yet another secondary explosion. The enemy troops quickly turned heel through the open rice paddies. Additional PBRs and other support craft were soon on the scene and by nine o’clock that evening, the battle was over with the PBRs claiming 35 vessels sunk and the capture of six others. Det 25 claimed 16 additional junks and sampans destroyed, seven more damaged and neutralization of numerous shore positions. The combined operation stopped the river crossing and the VC were routed leaving indications of substantial casualities. Unfortunately, not all the Seawolves early operations were as successful as the one on 31 October. At least two aircraft were lost in operational accidents during 1966. One on 2 November involved a Det 29 UH-1B which ditched in water when it lost power shortly after take off from My Tho on a strike mission. The second occurred 27 days later and resulted from an extremely unusual set of circumstances.

Det 25’s two UB-1Bs were assigned to escort three Navy Patrol Air Cushion Vehicles (PACV) on a move from An Long to Moc Hoa. As an additional part of their mission that day, one aircraft was carrying a photographer to cover the PACV’s in action. Shortly after getting airborne from An Long, the gunship with the photographer aboard maneuvered over the line of PACV’s at an altitude of 60 feet to get close overhead photos. As the lead air cushion vehicle passed under, the UB-1B lost lift when it apparently encountered turbulence created by the PACV’s lift fan and propeller. The Det 25 pilot was unable to make a power recovery and the helicopter settled into about four feet of water where the crew egressed safely.

It was evident from the outset that the origional four detachments, no matter how strategically located, could not provide adequate coverage to the entire Mekong Delta. Additional detachments would be needed to fill the expanding operational demends. As necessary as this expansion was for mission accomplishment, it would create ever larger problems for command and control of the detachments involved. While HC-1 had performed well as a caretaker of these units, it’s normal mission was so radically different from that of the Game Warden detachments that the Navy felt a more integrated and localized command structure was necessary to assure continuity in all aspects of the TF-116 mission.

So, late in 1966, a message was sent out to all Navy helicopter squadrons requesting volunteers to form a Vietnam based helicopter attack squadron. Approximately 80 pilots were chosen from this first group, and after a brief training period provided by the Army, they began reporting for duty in Vietnam during April 1967, where they would be used to help fill the slots of three new dets then in the formulating stages, and provide relief for existing crews who would soon reach the end of their one year tour. As additional UH-1B helicopters became available, and as the crews completed their transition training, these new dets would be put into service. The men of HC-1’s four Vietnam based detachments became the Seawolves of Helicopter Attack (Light) Squadron Three, HA(L)-3, on 1 April 1967, when the squadron was officially commissioned at Vung Tau under the command of LCDR Joseph B. Howard. HC-1 Dets 29, 27, 25 and 21 became HA(L)-3 Dets 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.

 

 

Training

As previously mentioned, the origional group of pilots from HC-1 underwent their initial training only upon arrival in Vietnam. Here they obtained approximately 10 hours of familiarization in the UH-1B, and then another 60 hours or more as copilots aboard Army gunships under actual combat conditions. From this they graduated to flying combat missions on their own in the Navy UH-1Bs. A few of the early pilots recieved a limited amount of their transition at the Bell Helicopter plant in Texas prior to reporting aboard in Vietnam, and later, some training was done at NAS Imperial Beach. Eventually, a special training program was established in 1967 by the Army at Ft. Benning, Georgia to handle the increasing requirement for Navy UH-1B pilots. By September 1968, this program had been transferred to Ft Rucker, Alabama. Here the training syllabus for the prospective Seawolves included two weeks of UH-1B transition, one and one half weeks of active gunnery training, and classroom instruction on the weapons systems as well as armed helicopter tactics and employment. In addition, they were given practical field problems in the different phases of riverine support operations in which they would have to become proficient. Such subjects as low level navigation, river convoy escort and river reconnaissance would later stand them in good stead.

Even after completion of this specialized program, some of the more inexperienced pilots would often get their first taste of combat as copilots on Army helicopters, thus enabling them to gain more flight time and experience prior to beginning their Navy missions. All pilots underwent three weeks of survival training at either Little Creek, Virginia, or Coronado, California, before assignment to Vietnam.

Once their initial requirements were fulfilled, the new pilots would begin their Navy operations as copilots. After several months they could be elevated to Attack Helicopter Aircraft Commander (AHAC), which meant they moved across the cockpit to the pilot seat. Still later, they could be classified as Fire Team Leader (FTL), responsible for the conduct and success of their det’s two helicopter element (fire team) during missions.

Training was not totally confined to flying. Several of the early HA(L)-3 pilots would also go aboard the PBRs on missions to get a better understanding of the role and working environment of these small boats. Also, a few pilots were known to have accompanied SEAL Teams on some of their operations.

Enlisted crew members could recieve their training either prior to departing the States, after arrival in Vietnam, or a combination of both. Generally, all would recieve schooling in their occupational specialty before arriving in Vietnam. Like the officers, all would undergo survival school before departing.

But as the flying jobs in the squadron were voluntary, training in these areas varied. If enlisted personnel volunteered for flying duties prior to departure for Vietnam, door gunner training was sometimes provided by the Army at Ft Rucker. Here was taught the basics of UH-1B Maintenance, fundamentals of helicopter armamant systems, aerial gunnery, and visual search and target detection. If, however, crewmen elected to volunteer for flying after arrival in Vietnam, or had not gone to the Army school, HA(L)-3 provided gunnery training at it’s headquarters facility. By 1969, the enlisted crewmen training program was well established. All enlisted air crewmen took the HA(L)-3 Plane Captain (Crew Chief) course prior to assignment to a det. This allowed all gunners to become qualified Plane Captains and vice versa.

 

Aircraft
Journal American Aviation Historical Society, Winter, 1988
 

The Gunships
Markings
List of Aircraft
Seawolves Down
Scott Kraska’s Seawolf Restoration
Complete List of Aircraft Serial Numbers
 

The Gunships

The Bell UH-1 armed helicopters operated by HA(L)-3 were, in most respects, straight line Army machines. Temporarily surplused from the Army inventory, these helicopters had usually already seen a lot of long and hard use. Those received directly from the Army units in Vietnam most often required a good deal of repair and rejuvenation before being sent out into Naval service. Others received from the Army’s overhaul depot in Corpus Christi, Texas, were generally in much better condition. “Navalizing” these helicopters was relatively simple involving addition of the specialized door gun mounts and a radar altimeter. The radar altimeter was a crucial piece of equipment, for operating over the flat delta terrain in bad weather, at night, in the absence of a good horizon reference, required precision altitude indications. This was especially true when recovering aboard the support ships at night as landing aids were very rudimentary. A shortage of radar altimeters plagued the squadron for many months so that they were rationed to those dets which operated off the boats, and even then it was not unusual to find only one helicopter in a det with this specialized instrument.

The UH-1B, which formed the backbone of the squadron’s aircraft assets, was powered by a Lycoming T53-L-11 engine and incorporated a standard Bell UH-1 rotor head. In 1970 a few UH-1C’s found their way into HA(L)-3. The UH-1C, although equipped with the same engine as the B, used a new flex beam main rotor which provided easier maintenance and some improvement in maneuverability. But more importantly, the “Charlie” model incorporated an increase in both gross weight (+1,000 pounds) and fuel capacity (+77 gallons) which combined to expand operational capability.

Still another improvement was the UH-1M, the first examples of which were introduced into the unit on 15 June 1971. Essentially a UH-1C equipped with the Lycoming T53-L-13 powerplant, the “Mike” model’s additional 300 horsepower offered some slight improvement in the squadron’s performance ability. As the Seawolf gunships were rarely flown at anywhere less than over the maximum gross weight, any increase in engine performance was a much needed commodity. It was planned for HA(L)-3 to equip entirely with the Mike model, but the heavy demand for this engine (also used on the UH-1H and AH-1G) kept the Navy on the low side of the priority list. By December 1971, only 11 of the Seawolve’s gunships were UH-1M’s.

 

 

Markings

The UH1B, C, and M gunships transferred by the Army to HA(L)-3 generally already had seen a good deal of combat. They retained, for the most part, the standard Army olive drab paint scheme although after commissioning of the squadron some helicopters were apparently repainted in a black or deep navy blue color, either completely or partial. There is no evidence to indicate this was a squadron wide policy, however.

Origionally, the words United States Navy were carried in black on both sides of the tailboom. After formation of HA(L)-3 early in 1967, this was gradually replaced with the word Navy in large white letters. Some photos, however, show the word Navy in black, and it is believed this was a very early style marking dating from the 1967 period which was not necessarily representative of all squadron aircraft.

Also, after commissioning, a three digit “modex” code beginning with the numeral 3 was assigned and carried on the vertical fin of all gunships. Although these machines retained their origional Army serial numbers, this code became the aircraft “tail number.” Photographs exist of HA(L)-3 helicopters with a white three digit tail code beginning with other than 3, but it is felt these numbers were simply the last three digits of the Army serial number which had been highlighted in white for expediency pending assignment of a permanent squadron number.

Some HA(L)-3 detachments carried the squadron and det identification in small white letters on the tailboom aft of the horizintal stabilizer. However, this does not appear to have been a squadron wide practice and is believed to date from the 1967-1968 time frame. After 1968, nearly all gunships carried on their nose the HA(L)-3 insignia, a forebreathing dragon carrying a trident and shield all emblazoned on a circular field of white.

The UH1Ls and HH1Ks assigned to HA(L)-3 were painted in the then standard navy gray with associated markings and no apparent attempt was made to repaint them in the subdued scheme carried by the gunships. The only modex code known to have been carried by the Sealords were the letters SL followed by a one or two digit number. This became the helicopter call sign and probably tail number as well, the SL standing for Sealord. Some sources have suggested SL may have been the official Navy tail code assigned to HA(L)-3, but no evidence has ever surfaced to officially verify this. It is felt this was simply a local modex applied by the squadron to uniquely and quickly identify the Sealord helicopters as a sepatate entity from the gunship elements

 

 

List of Aircraft

The list of helicopters used by the Seawolves in Vietnam has been compiled from numerous sources including official documents, magazine articles and photographs. Although the squadron at maximum strength probably never operated more than 40 aircraft at any one time, the actual number of helicopters assigned to the squadron between 1966 and 1972 was considerably more.

 

 

 

Army Ser No
Navy Bu No
 Model Tail # Notes
62-1936
UH-1B
Assigned 7/26/71
62-1970
UH-1B
327
Assigned 12/6/70. Damaged by ground fire, 2 wounded 4/14/71. Det 1 Nov 71
62-1985
UH-1B
Assigned 3/3/71
62-2025
UH-1B
309
Assigned 6/13/71
62-2031
UH-1B
Assigned 10/10/71
62-2034
UH-1B
321
Assigned 4/15/69. Det 6, damaged by engine failure at Song Ong Doc, 12/16/70. Assigned Det 5, 3/71. Det 7, damaged by ground fire 7/27/71. Det 2, cabin damaged by paraflare ignition 12/7/71
62-2038
UH-1B
316
Det 6, engine failure at Ca Mau 11/11/70. Det 3, damaged in hard landing at Nam Can 12/16/70. Det 1, damaged by ground fire 12/26/70. Windshield shattered by ground fire, pilots slightly wounded, 1/8/71
62-4567
UH-1B
Det 1 and Det 3
62-4579
UH-1B
306
Det 3, destroyed by fire from crash landing at Ca Mau after engine failure, one crewman killed, 10/3/70
62-4597
UH-1B
Assigned 8/22/71
62-4602
UH-1B
322
Assigned 10/10/70. Det 4, broke up in flight, all 4 crewmen killed including Det CO 6/20/71
62-4604
UH-1B
Assigned 11/25/70
62-12515
UH-1B
321
Assigned 1968, Det 7.
62-12542
UH-1B
Assigned 1/3/70. in service with Det 7 11/70
62-12543
UH-1B
Assigned 8/1/71
63-8540
UH-1B
312
Assigned 6/22/69. in service with Det 3, 11/70, damaged by ground fire 5/9/71
63-8545
UH-1B
305
Det 1, water damage from engine failure over Bo De River 10/24/70
63-8547
UH-1B
312
Assigned 10/5/70.
63-8589
UH-1B
326
Det 1, damaged by ground fire, 3 wounded 2/21/71. Shot down 8/11/71, helicopter recovered
63-8666
UH-1B
Assigned 2/14/69.
63-8679
UH-1B
Assigned 8/23/71.
63-8715
UH-1B
Assigned 10/31/70. Det 2, damaged in hard landing at Phu Loi 11/12/70. Det 6, lost to engine failure over Gulf of Thailand 2/17/71
63-8738
UH-1B
Assigned 5/30/69.
63-12923
UH-1B
Assigned 11/19/70. Det 9, damaged by 75mm recoilless rifle fire aboard YRBM-21 5/28/71
63-12923
UH-1B
312
Crashed inverted from unknown cause near Kien Long, all 4 crewmen killed 12/19/70
63-12930
UH-1B
Assigned 11/4/70
63-12943
UH-1B
In service with HC-1 Det 25, 1966
64-13919
UH-1B
Assigned 11/4/70
64-12934
UH-1B
Det 7, destroyed on impact with dike near Dong Tam due to loss of rotor RPM, no casualties 11/16/70.
63-12946
UH-1B
HC-1 Det 25, extensive water damage from accident involving PACV 11/29/66.
64-13939
UH-1B
Assigned 7/23/70. Det 9, destroyed by 75mm recoilless rifle fire aboard YRBM-21, 5/28/71.
64-13943
UH-1B
328
Assigned 12/13/70. In service with Det 4, 10/71
64-13948
UH-1B
322
Det 8, battle damage to cabin, 10/17/71
64-13974
UH-1B
HC-1 Det 29, lost over water to engine failure, no casualties 2/11/66.
64-13975
UH-1B
Assigned 6/24/69
64-13980
UH-1B
Assigned 9/20/70
64-13990
UH-1B
Assigned 5/18/70. Minigun malfunction, both pilots one gunner injured 1/25/71. Destroyed in training accident at Ca Mau, both pilots injured 4/7/71
64-14007
UH-1B
Assigned 2/14/71
64-14020
UH-1B
Assigned 4/21/70. Damaged by ground fire, one crewman wounded 4/29/71
64-14022
UH-1B
Assigned 1/3/70
64-14031
UH-1B
315
Ditched in Gulf of Thailand after loosing directional control on approach to USS Garrett Co. 4/13/70. Aircraft recovered
64-14033
UH-1B
Assigned 9/13/70
64-14070
UH-1B
Assigned 9/13/70
64-14076
UH-1B
Assigned 11/8/69
64-14081
UH-1B
Assigned 10/28/70
64-14083
UH-1B
330
Assigned 11/20/69. On board rocket detonated by ground fire, 1 crewman killed 4/19/71. Det 5, damaged by ground fire 8/15/71 and heavily damaged in forced landing from engine failure 8/28/71
64-14087
UH-1B
Assigned 6/30/71
64-14090
UH-1B
Assigned 7/24/69
64-14091
UH-1B
Assigned 8/4/71
64-14117
UH-1M
Assigned 11/3/71
64-14145
UH-1C
Assigned 11/17/70
65-9423
UH-1M
Assigned 6/30/71
65-9476
UH-1M
314
Assigned 11/15/70. Det 9, damaged by ground fire 9/17/71. Assigned Det 2, 11/71
65-9548
UH-1M
Assigned 11/19/71
66-540
UH-1C
Det 2, lost to engine failure over water, no casualties 3/8/71
66-599
UH-1M
Assigned 9/8/71
66-610
UH-1C
Assigned 7/11/71
66-616
UH-1M
316
Shot down with 4 wounded, destroyed to prevent capture 8/28/71
66-655
UH-1M
Assigned 9/9/71
66-15017
UH-1M
Assigned 12/18/71
66-15077
UH-1M
313
Assigned 7/6/71
66/15111
UH-1M
302
Assigned 9/7/71. Det 5, damaged by ground fire 9/20/71
66-15200
UH-1C
312
Det 5, shot down 20 miles N. of Chau Doc, no casualties, helicopter recovered 11/18/71
66-15236
UH-1M
Assigned 9/8/71
66-15977
UH-1C
Assigned 7/11/71
157187
HH-1K
SL11
Destroyed during external hoist operation, 2 crewmen injured 10/18/71
157200
HH-1K
SL1
Assigned 11/1/71. Damaged by ground fire, 1 crewman wounded 4/29/71
157202
HH-1K
Assigned 11/1/71
157203
HH-1K
Lost over Gulf of Thailand to unknown causes, no casualties 11/26/70
157851
UH-1L
Crashed on approach to Binh Thuy, all 3 crewmen killed 6/1/70
157852
UH-1L
Assigned 12/11/69
157853
UH-1L
SL3
Assigned 12/11/69. Destroyed in landing accident, both pilots injured 12/22/71
157854
UH-1L
Assigned 12/11/69. Damaged by ground fire, one crewman wounded 1/9/71
157855
UH-1L
Assigned 1/22/70. Damaged due to engine failure near Vi Thanh 10/12/70
157856
UH-1L
SL6
Assigned 1/22/70. Crashed on takeoff at Binh Thuy, no casualties 8/13/70
157857
UH-1L
SL7
Crashed at Long Phu due to tail rotor control failure, one crewman injured 4/26/70
157858
UH-1L
SL10
Assigned 1/22/70